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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MYRNA FABRIZIO, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
FIDELITY AND GUARANTY 
LIFE INSURANCE COMP ANY, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12596 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action filed by plaintiff, appellant, 
claiming that a standard risk life insurance policy 
was duly applied for and the risk accepted by the 
defendant insurance company and that plaintiff is 
entitled to the benefits thereon as the contingent 
beneficiary of the deceased Delbert Fabrizio. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The respective parties filed Motions for Sum-
mary Judgment. Subsequently pursuant to the stip-
ulation of the respective counsel made in open Court 
that all of the depositions of the parties and copies 
of the various correspondence, documents and pa-
pers attached thereto as exhibits and requests for 
1 
admissions af!d response thereto might all be receiv-
ed by the Court as evidence, and the said depositions 
and attached exhibits and the requests for admis-
sions and responses thereto all having been received 
as evidence, and the evidence being closed, and the 
parties having stipulated there would be no further 
evidence and that the case as submitted and the said 
proceedings would constitute the trial of the matte~ 
the trial Court entered judgment in favor of de-
fendant respop.dent and against plaintiff appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the judgment on the 
merits rendered by the trial Court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Gale Holt, an employee of the Utah Central In-
surance Agency (R 115) was a soliciting agent (R 
148) authorized to solicit and submit to the Fidelity 
and Guaranty Life Insurance Company applications 
for insurance and annuities and to collect the first 
premiums thereon and to forward them to the Fidel-
ity and Guaranty Life Insurance Company herein-
after called defendant. (R 114; 115) 
Neither Gale Holt nor his employer the Central 
Utah Insurance Agency had authority to receive any 
money on behalf of the company except the first pre-
mium, or to modify or extend credit in any respect 
in behalf of the company or to modify or waive any 
provision in any policy or application .or, to issue any 
policy on behalf of the defendant. (R 114, 115, l96) 
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On June 27, 1967, Delbert Fabrizio the hus-
' band of the plaintiff-appellant, Myrna Fabrizio, met 
with his mother and father and Paul Murphy in the 
office of the First Security Bank of Utah in Roose-
velt. Paul Murphy, the manager of the bank was 
making a bank loan to the deceased D~lbert Fabrizio 
and plaintiff. 
Paul Murphy suggested the deceased Delbert 
Fabrizio should obtain additional life insurance al-
though it was not necessary. At this suggestion, Gale 
Holt "the soliciting agent" was called to the office 
of the First Security Bank of Utah and while all par-
ties were present, presented an application to Del-
bert Fabrizio for an ERT (Executive Reducing 
Term) life insurance policy. (R 52, 53) Mr. Delbert 
Fabrizio completed the application while all parties 
were present. The application was for a standard 
risk policy in the face amount of $25,000.00 (R 122) 
showing the First Security Bank of Utah NA as 
beneficiary and plaintiff herein as the contingent 
beneficiary to the balance remaining if any. 
Gale Holt advised the deceased Delbert Fabrizio 
that it would be necessary for him to obtain a med-
ical examination. (Deposition of Gale Holt R 54 lines 
lines 3-9) Gale Holt, the soliciting agent, advised the 
decedent Delbert Fabrizio that as the agent he could 
not bind coverage but the application would have to 
be accepted by the insurance company. (Deposition 
of Gale Holt R 62, R 64, R 82) The application (R 
3 
17 4) signed by plaintiff provided and contained the 
following language : 
I have read the above questions and an-
swers and hereby declare that they are com-
plete and true to the best of my knowledge and 
belief. I agree that only the Chairman of the 
Board, the President, a Vice President, the 
Secretary or an Assistant Secretary of the 
Company can make, modify or discharge con-
tracts on behalf of the Company, or waive any 
of the Company's rights or requirements. I 
agree that no insurance shall take effect un-
less and until the policy has been delivered to 
and received and accepted by me and the first 
premium paid during the life time of the Pro-
posed Insured and while his state of health is 
as stated in the application, except as provided 
in The Conditional Receipt bearing the same 
number as this application if a premium has 
been paid as indicated in item 21 above and 
such Receipt issued." (R 17 4) 
The application for insurance by the decedent 
Delbert Fabrizio was forwarded by Gale Holt, solic-
iting agent, to the Salt Lake branch office of defen-
dant on June 27, 1967. (R 87)' The application was 
forwarded by the Salt Lake branch office to the home 
office of the defendant. 
Shortly after June 27, 1967 a Conditional Re-
ceipt was delivered to the decendent Delbert Fabrizio 
by Gale Holt (R 57, R 65) which also provided that 
issuance of the receipt did not place any insurance in 
effect for any period unless the proposed insured was 
insurable and acceptable. (R 180) 
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On June 30, 1967 the decedent Delbert Fabrizio 
was examined by M. Buxton, M.D. at Roosevelt, 
Utah. The medical examination revealed that Delbert 
Fabrizio, a man 5' 11" tall, weighing 329 pounds had 
a high blood pressure abnormality. The medical re-
port (R 177) was forwarded directly to the defen-
dant by the doctor. 
The defendant on July 7, 1967 for obvious rea-
sons and as a result of the report of a high blood pres-
sure abnormality acted upon the application of Del-
berte Fabrizio as a standard risk and declined to ac-
cept it. (R 184) That same date the home office of 
defendant notified the Salt Lake office by letter that 
the policy applied for was not available at the Table 
H rate and that before a policy could be issued it 
would have to be determined what rate would be ap-
plicable to the decedent and in order to do so would 
need an additional report from the decedent Delbert 
Fabrizio's attending physician and a blood pressure 
re-check examination. (R. 184) 
On July 10, 1967 a copy of the letter from the 
home office dated July 7, 1967 rejecting the applica-
tion was received by Gale Holt. (R 70, 71)' On or 
about July 15, 1967 the Salt Lake office of defendant 
provided Gale Holt with cost figures for various life 
insurance policies at a basic Table H rate. On July 
31, 1967 Gale Holt and his employer sent a letter to 
the decedent Delbert Fabrizio (R 71, 72) advising 
him that the medical report indicated probable high 
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blood pressure and requested the decedent Delbert 
Fabrizio to come to the office of Gale Holt and his 
employer to discuss the possibility of rated insurance 
and to make arrangements for a blood pressure re-
check. (R 181) Neither the decedent Delbert Fab-
rizio nor anyone on his behalf ever responded to said 
letter. (R 72) 
On July 18, 1967 the defendant home office sent 
a letter to the Salt Lake office requesting a reply to 
their letter on July 7, 1967 ( R 230), a copy of which 
had been forwarded to Gale Holt. On July 26, 1967 
the home office of defendant sent a second request to 
the Salt Lake office requesting a reply to their letter 
of July 7, 1967 which had rejected the application 
and inquiring if the decedent Delbert Fabrizio was 
interested in rated insurance, ( R 230, 192) a copy 
of this second request was sent to Gale Holt (R 230) 
and received by him on July 31, 1967. 
On August 21, 1967 Gale Holt again wrote the 
decedent Delbert Fabrizio advising him of the neces-
sity and urgency of taking care of the matter. (R 
73, 185) There was no response to the second letter. 
(R 76, 77) 
On August 31, 1967 the home office of the de-
fendant closed their file on the case and returned to 
the Salt Lake office the premium paid by the dece-
dent Delbert Fabrizio. ( R 232, 193) On September 
7 1967 the refund check was delivered by Charles 
' Soelberg of the Salt Lake branch of defendant to Gale 
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Holt and his employer the Central Utah Insurance 
Agency. (R 233) On September 9, 1967 Gale Holt 
showed the refund check to the decedent Delbert 
Fabrizio and tendered it to him. (R 100) 
On that same date, September 9, 1967, Delbert 
Fabrizio stated he wished to obtain a policy of insur-
ance (R 107) and asked Gale Holt to return the re-
fund check to the company and to forward the addi-
tional sum of $150.50. On that date, Gale Holt, the 
soliciting agent, informed the decedent Delbert Fab-
rizio that no insurance was in effect and that the de-
cedent Delbert Fabrizio would have to submit to an 
additional physical examination before the company 
could proceed further with processing an application 
for him. (R 81, 82) 
Delbert Fabrizio never did submit to the addi-
tional medical examination. On September 12, 1967 
he was killed by falling logs. A letter together with 
the refund check and a check for $150.50 was sent by 
Gale Holt to the Salt Lake office of defendant after 
the death of Delbert Fabrizio. (R 101, 102, 195) The 
defendant received the letter together with the two 
premiums after the death of the decedent Delbert Fab-
rizio. R 242) The defendant tendered back to the 
heirs of the decedent Delbert Fabrizio all premiums 
tendered on behalf of Delbert Fabrizio. 
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POINT I 
APPELLANT THROUGH AN APPARENT ER-
ROR HAS FAILED TO BRING THIS APPEAL 
APPROPRIATELY BEFORE THIS COURT AND 
RESPONDENT MOVES TO DISMISS THIS AP-
PEAL. 
The relief sought on appeal is not available to 
appellant. The appellant stated in its ''RELIEF 
SOUGHT ON APPEAL" the following: 
'"Appellant seeks to have her motion for 
summary judgment granted or in the alterna-
tive that the matter be sent back for trial." 
Appellant filed its Motion for Summary Judg-
ment on April 12, 1971. (R 413) At the pre-trial the 
appellant moved for a trial date. (R 456) On April 
8, 1971 the appellant wrote a letter to the attorney 
for respondent indicating he had not noticed up his 
Motion for Summary Judgment for hearing before 
the Court and stated : 
"If you wish to have this Motion called up 
would you please let me know immediately so 
that I can notice it up as our trial comes on 
May 4th." (R. 479) 
On April 12, 1971 the respondent's attorney wrote 
a letter to appellant's attorney which contained the 
following language: 
"The trial date of May 4 is approaching 
rapidly. If the case is to be tried, it will be nec-
essary to commence making preparations to 
subpoena witnesses . . . We would. therefore 
like to have the matter resolved well m advance 
of an intended trial date if at all possible. We 
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therefore think it would be a good idea for you 
to call your Motion for Summary Judgment 
up for hearing before the Court as soon as pos-
sible." (R 480) 
The appellant never did notice up or call up for 
hearing its Motion for Summary Judgment. At the 
next hearing of record of the matter on April 21, 
1971 the appellant stipulated the trial could be held 
on that date. 
The stipulation of appellant was made a part 
of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
the Judgment. This Court's attention is respectfully 
drawn to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions o'f 
Law at R 415 and the Judgment at R 421 which con-
tains the following language: 
aThe parties having stipulated in open 
Court that all of the depositions of the parties 
and the copies o'f various correspondence, doc-
uments, papers attached thereto as exhibits 
and Requests for Admissions and responses 
thereto might all be received by the Court as 
evidence, and the said depositions and attach-
ed exhibits and the Requests for Admissions 
and the responses thereto all having been re-
ceived as evidence, and the evidence being clos-
ed, and the parties having stipulated there 
would be no further evidence and that the case 
as submitted and the said proceedings would 
constitute the trial of the matter, and the c.ause 
having been submitted to the Court for its de-
termination and decision, and the Court hav-
ing inquired into the legal sufficiency of the 
evidence so adduced, and having been fully ad-
9 
vised in the premises, the Court now makes 
and adopts the following:" (Emphasis ours) 
At no time has appellant ever made objection 
that the language above quoted did not set forth the 
stipulation as made by the respective parties before 
the trial Court. 
Inasmuch as appellant did not notice up its Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment and subsequently stip-
ulated that the trial could be held the appellant has 
waived and lost its right to now ask this Court to 
grant appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Since the trial was held on the case at bar pursuant 
to a stipulation between the parties the appellant can-
not ask for this Court to send the matter back for 
trial. It has already been tried. 
Rule 72 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
prior to the amendment which is not yet effective 
contains the following language: 
" (a) From Final Judgments. An appeal 
may be taken to the Supreme Court. from all 
final judgments, in accordance with these 
rules ; . . . In equity cases the appeal may be 
on questions of both law and fact. In cases at 
law the appeal shall be on questions of law 
only." 
The appellant filed its Notice of Appeal which 
contained the following language: 
~'Notice is hereby given that the above 
named Plaintiff hereby appeals to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah, from the courts or-
der dated June 3, 1971 and filed June 7, 1971 
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in the abov~-entitled court, granting Summary 
Judgment m favor of Defendant, Fidelity and 
Gu~ra!1tee Insurance Company and against 
Plamtiff, no cause of action that the action be ~ismissed with prejudice. A~d further, appeal 
is taken from the order of the court denying 
Pla~ntiff's motion for Summary Judgment 
agamst the Defendant, Fidelity and Guaran-
tee Insurance Company, dated the 3rd day of 
June, 1971 and filed on the 7th day of June 
1971." (R 482) ' 
The record at R 388 contains a memorandum 
decision dated March 4, 1970 which states that de-
fendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was de-
nied. There is nothing in the record which states that 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was de-
nied. 
The only order in the record dated June 3 and 
filed June 7 is the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and the Judgment. 
Apparently the appeal was taken by appellant 
on the erroneous assumption that there was an order 
entered denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and granting defendant's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment. 
As a result of this error on the part of appellant 
it now appears there is nothing appropriately before 
this Court and for this reason respondent moves to 
dismiss the appeal. The evidence and the merits of 
the case support the trial Court's decision and so the 
respondent provides the following points. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT HAVING FOUND FOR 
THE RESPONDENTS, IT IS THE PREROGA-
TIVE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH TO REVIEW THE EVI-
DENCE AND EVERY INFERENCE THAT 
MAY BE FAIRLY AND R E AS 0 NAB Ly 
DRAWN THEREFROM IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO RESPONDENTS. APPEL-
LANT HAD THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND 
FAILED TO SUSTAIN ITS BURDEN. 
This principle has been so firmly established by 
this Court that it should not be necessary to reiterate 
it further. This principle has been established in 
many cases: Fleming v. Fleming-Felt Company, 7 
Utah 2d 293, 323 P2d 712 (1958); Charlton v. Hac-
kett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P2d 176 (1961), and De 
Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P2d 290 (1962). 
While we realize that in the proceedings held the 
trial Court did not observe the witnesses directly it 
did read and review all the testimony of the various 
witnesses, read the memorandums of all parties and 
had the benefits of the argument of counsel. The trial 
Court then entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
1 
of Law before entering the Judgment. · 
In the brief of appellant there is no argument 
that the trial Court made erroneous findings or that 
the findings were unsupported by the record. Appel-
lant having made no objection to the findings should 
be bound by them. If, the appellant were taking issue 
with any of the findings it was the obligation of the 
appellant to point out in its brief wherein the find-
12 
ings of the trial Court were not supported by the evi-
dence and to show by the record evidence which would 
compel different findings. 
Considering the three factors together: One, the 
trial Court made findings after reviewing all the evi-
dence and testimony and; Two, the appellant has not 
objected to any of the findings and; Three, this Court 
has on many occasions set forth the rule that the evi-
dence will be viewed in a light most favorable to sus-
tain the findings of the trial Court - Respondent 
will review the evidence and the various findings of 
the trial Court in the separate points which follow in 
respondent's brief. 
Appellant at all times had the burden of proof. 
Appellant did not have sufficient evidence to sustain 
the burden of proof and convince the trial Court of 
the merit of its claims. The evidence showed that as 
a matter of fact the plaintiff-appellant was not en-
titled to recover on its Complaint against defendant. 
POINT III 
AN APPLICATION BY THE DECEDENT DEL-
BERT FABRIZIO FOR AN "ERT" LIFE INSUR-
ANCE POLICY WAS ONLY AN APPLICATION 
WHICH HAD TO BE ACTED UPON BY THE 
DULY AUTHORIZED OFFICERS OF THE DE-
FENDANT INSURANCE COMP ANY AND A 
CONTRACT OF INSURANCE ISSUED, PRE-
SENTED TO THE DECEDENT DELBERT F AB-
RIZIO AND ACCEPTED BY HIM BEFORE IT 
COULD TAKE EFFECT. 
The application for the policy of insurance which 
13 
was made out by the decedent Delbert Fabrizio con-
tained language among other things as fallows: 
"I have read the above questions and an-
swers and hereby declare that they are com-
plete and true to the best of my knowledge and 
belief. I agree that only the chairman of the 
board, the president, a vice president, the sec-
retary or an assistant secretary of the com-
pany can make, modify or discharge contracts 
on behalf of the company, or waive any of the 
company's rights or requirements. I agree that 
no insurance shall take effect unless and until 
the policy has been delivered to and received 
and accepted by me and the first premium paid 
during the lifetime of the proposed insured 
while his state of health is as stated in the ap-
plication, except as provided in the conditional 
receipt bearing the same number as this ap-
plication if a premium has been paid as indi-
cated in item 21 above and such receipt issued. 
Dated at Roosevelt, Utah on June 27, 1967 
Signature of 
Proposed Insured 
/s/ Delbert Fabrizio" 
(R174) 
The above quoted language from the application 
for the "ERT" (Executive Reducing Term) life in-
surance policy is amply clear under the terms of the 
application that no policy of insurance could take ef-
fect unless the policy was made and issued by one of 
the named officials in the defendant company. The 
decedent Delbert Fabrizio agreed in writing (by 
signing the application) to be bound by the above 
quoted terms. 
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. "In the ordina~y ~ff ectuation of a policy 
of msurance, negotiations therefor are initi-
ated 1?Y an application by the person seeking 
such msurance. 'The application itself is not 
the contract, but is a mere offer or proposal 
for a contract of insurance. It is merely a step 
in the creation of the insurance contract. Be-
fore the contract of insurance is effected and 
any contractual relationship exists between 
the parties it is necessary that the application 
be accepted by the insurer, since it is well set-
tled that insurance companies are not compel-
led to accept every application presented and 
may stipulate upon what terms and for what 
period of time the risk will be accepted." ( 43 
Arn J ur 2d Insurance Section 209 at page 265) 
"Until the application is accepted, no con-
tractual relationship exists between an appli-
cant for insurance and the insurance company. 
The acceptance of the application or proposal 
for insurance is necessary to make the policy 
of insurance founded thereon binding and ef-
fective, especially where by the terms of the 
application its approval is required before the 
risk shall attach. 
'''As a general rule and apart from ex-
press stipulations to a contrary effect, a con-
tract of insurance is consummated by and not 
until the unconditional acceptance of the ap-
plication or proposal for such insur?-nc~, and 
this is the rule even though the application or 
proposal is accompanied by the pay~ent of .the 
premium. The acceptance must be m the lif~­
time of the applicant. If the death of the appli-
cant intervenes, no contract is effected." ( 43 
Am Jur 2d Insurance Section 210 at page 267) 
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Similar language is found in Couch on Insur-
ance as fallows: 
"~n the law of insurance, an application, 
sometimes ref erred to as a proposal is a re-
quest for a contract of insurance to be issued 
to the applicant by an insurer. It is not a con-
tract, but a mere proposal for insurance, which 
is usually understood to mean, under a form 
of contract in use by the insurer. Acceptance 
of the offer by the insurer is required for the 
completion of a contract of insurance.· In the 
absence of provisions for temporary insur-
ance, even the acceptance of the application 
does not effect a contract of insurance between 
the applicant and the insurer, where the at-
tachment of the risk is conditioned upon and 
delivery of a formal policy. As hereinbefore 
observed, however, once the insurance contract 
is completed, the application may be a part 
thereof." (Couch on Insurance 2d Section 7 : 1 
at pages 27 and 28) 
POINT IV 
THE APPLICA'Tl:ON OF THE DECEDENT 
DELBERT 'FABRIZIO FOR A LIFE INSUR-
ANCE POLICY WAS RE'JECTED BY THE COM-
P ANY AND NOTIFICATION THEREON GIVEN 
AND 'THE PREMIUM RETURNED TO THE 
DECEDENT PRIOR TO HIS DEATH. 
On July 1, 1967 after considering the applica· 
tion of the decedent Delbert Fabrizio the defendant 
declined to accept it and sent the following memor· 
andum to its Salt Lake office: 
"Subject to a report from this individual's 
attending physician and a blood pressure re· 
check, we can only consider him at a minimum 
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of our ~able H rate .. ~owever, be.fore we pro-
ceed with the addit10nal reqmrements , it 
should just be determined whether Mr. F~bri­
zio is inter~ste~ in rated insurance. Also you 
should advise of an alternate plan since the 
ERT policy is not available at the above rate." 
(R 184) 
Although Gale Holt wrote two letters advising 
Delbert Fabrizio of the rejection of the application, 
Delbert Fabrizio did not respond to the requests of 
Gale Holt to contact him. 
On August 31, 1967 as a result of receiving no 
response to the memo of July 7, 1967 the home office 
of defendant closed its file on the application of Del-
bert Fabrizio and returned the original premium to 
be delivered to Delbert Fabrizio. The memorandum 
accompanying the refund check contained the follow-
mg: 
"We have had no reply to our memo of 
July 7 and have filed this case incomplete. 
Please have the enclosed check for $75.50 de-
livered to Mr. Fabrizio and instruct the agent 
to mail the attached postcard when delivery of 
the check has been accomplished." (R 193) 
The refund was tendered to Delbert Fabrizio by 
Gale Holt on September 9, 1967. (R 100) Delbert 
Fabrizio was killed September 12, 1967. 
The trial Court made and entered its Findings 
of Fact that the application of Delbert Fabrizio was 
rejected and notification was given to Delbert Fab-
rizio and the premium was tendered back to Delbert 
Fabrizio prior to his death. (R 415.:419) ·The find-
ings of the trial Court (R 417, 418) were supported 
17 
by the record and there is no evidence to the contrary. 
The action of the defendant resulted in a com-
plete rejection of the application of Delbert Fabrizio 
and sufficient notice of the rejection prior to the 
death of Delbert Fabrizio. 
POINT V 
NO COUNTER-OFFER OF INSURANCE WAS 
MADE BY DEFENDANT TO THE DECEASED 
DELBERT FABRIZIO. 
(a) GALE HOLT WAS WITHOUT AUTH-
ORITY TO MAKE AN OFFER OF INSUR-
ANCE ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS OR 
TO BIND DEFENDANT ON ANY POLI-
CIES AND THE LIMITATION ON HIS 
AUTHORITY WAS COMMUNICATED TO 
THE DECEDENT DELBERT FABRIZIO. 
Gale Holt, the soliciting agent, notified Delbert 
Fabrizio on the date the application for insurance 
was signed that Gale Holt had limited authority. 
"I says, nobody can bind life insurance. It 
is only acceptable as to the provisions of the 
company." (R 62) 
The Agency Agreement under which Gale Holt 
as an employee of the Central Utah Insurance Agency 
operated was one of very limited authority. In part 
the agreement limits the authority of the agent as 
follows: 
''The Agent is not authorized: to receive 
any mone:y on behalf of the qoi;ipany except 
first premmms ·to extend credit many respect 
on behalf of th~ Company; to modify or waive 
any provision in any policy or application; to 
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d~live.r a polic~ unless a full first premium re-
cited m the policy has been paid and the named 
Insured is in good health to the best of the 
Agent's knowledge; or to make any contract 
o~ behalf of the Company, except in accordance 
with t~e Co.mpany's conditional receipt form 
when given m exchange for the first premium, 
or part thereof, paid with an original applica-
tion for insurance or annuity." (R 196) 
The limited authority of the agent was set forth 
in the body of the application signed by Delbert Fab-
rizio and in the conditional receipt (R 180) and by 
signing the application Delbert Fabrizio agreed to 
the limitations stated therein. 
(b) ONLY THE NAMED OFFICIALS IN 
THE DEFENDANT COMPANY COULD 
MAKE, MODIFY OR DISCHARGE CON-
TRACTS ON BEHALF OF THE COMPANY, 
OR WAIVE ANY OF THE COMPANY'S 
RIGHTS OR REQUIREMENTS. 
The application signed by the decendent Delbert 
Fabrizio contained the following language: 
"I agree that only the Chairman of the 
Board, the President, a Vice President, the 
Secretary or an Assistant Secretary of the 
Company can make, modify or dischar~e con-
tracts on behalf of the Company, or waive any 
of the Company's rights or requirements." (R 
174) 
The burden of proof of a counter-offer was on 
the plaintiff-appellant. At no time was any evidence 
introduced to show either: 
1. That the authority to make a counter-offer 
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extended beyond the previous named officials in the 
defendant company, or to show: 
2. That one of the named officials in the defen-
dant company made the alleged counter- offer. 
The trial Court appropriately refused to make 
a finding of a counter-offer as any such finding 
would be wholly unsupported by the record. 
The exhibit upon which the appellant relies to 
establish the alleged counter-offer (appellant's brief 
page 18) contained the following language when it 
left the home office of defendant: 
"Subject to a report from this individual's 
attending physician and a blood pressure re-
check, we can only consider him at a minimum 
of our Table H rate. However, before we pro-
ceed with the additional requirements, it 
should first be determined whether Mr. Fab-
rizio is interested in rated insurance. Also, 
you should advise of an alternate plan, since 
the ERT policy is not available at the above 
rate." (R 189) 
Even if this Court were to overlook the failure 
of the appellant to establish the authority of the in-
dividual who allegedly made the counter-offer the 
language quoted above could not be construed as a 
counter-off er. 
(c) THE ALLEGED COUNTER-OFFER IF 
THERE WAS ONE WAS WITHDRAWN BY 
DEFENDANT PRIOR TO ITS ACCEPT-
ANCE BY APPELLANT. 
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Having received no response to the memo pre-
viously set forth (which appellant alleges is the 
counter-offer). the defendant sent two follow up in-
quiries requesting a response to the memorandum. 
('R 191, 192) 
On August 31, 1967, nearly two months later, 
after receiving no response the defendant home of-
fice sent the following memorandum to the Salt Lake 
office of defendant: 
"We have had no reply to our memo of 
July 7 and have filed this case incomplete. 
Please have the enclosed check for $75.50 de-
livered to Mr. Fabrizio and instruct the agent 
to mail the attached postcard when delivery of 
the check has been accomplished." (R 193) 
This memorandum constituted a withdrawal or 
revocation of the alleged counter-dffer prior to any 
alleged acceptance by appellant. This information 
was communicated to Delbert Fabrizio and the pre-
mium tendered back to him prior to his death and 
prior to the date of his alleged acceptance of the as-
serted counter-offer. 
POINT VI 
THE CONDITIONAL RECEIPT ATTACHED TO 
THE INSURANCE APPLICATION DID NOT 
CONTAIN AMBIGUITIES OR CONFLICTING 
PROVISIONS AND DELBERT FABRIZIO FAIL-
ED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS CON-
TAINED THEREIN. 
The appellant devotes five points of its brief to 
the theory of ambiguities in the conditional receipt. 
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The entire. argument is inapplicable to this case be-
cause as is previously pointed out in this brief th~ 
entire file on appellant's application was closed and 
the premium was tendered back to appellant prior 
to his death. For this reason it does not matter wh~­
ther the conditional receipt contanied an ambiguity 
or not. 
Respondent, however, will respond to the argu-
ments contained in appellant's brief concerning am-
biguities. 
As has been previously stated in this brief in-
surance applications are not contracts of insurance 
and are treated differently. Appellant cites four 
Utah cases in its brief at page 6. Not one of the cases 
cited involve either a life insurance policy, an appli-
cation or a conditional receipt. All four cases involve 
construction of language in automobile casualty and 
fire policies. 
Jorgensen v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 
13 Utah 2d 303 (1962), 373 P2d 580, defined words 
"fire" and "direct loss by fire" in a fire insurance ' 
policy. Stout v. Washington Fire and Marine Insur-
ance Company, 14 Utah 2d 414 ( 1963, 385 P2d 608, 
defined the word "premises" in a fire insurance pol-
icy. P. E. Ashton Company v. Jaynes, 17 Utah 2d 162 
( 1965), 406 P2d 306 defined the word ''theft" in an 
auteomobile insurance policy. Christensen v. Fann-
ers Insurance Exchange, 21Utah2d 194 (1968) 443 
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P2d 385, def ~µed the word and phrase "used" or "be-
ing used in the automobile business." . · 
~ Eye~y ·case· Git~d .by appellant to sustain its 
theory of insurance coverage involved a situation in 
which the policy applied for by the applicant was 
available to the applicant and after the medical ex-
amination the insurance coma)fy· retained· the pre-
mium. In no case cited was applicant advised the 
policy a plied for was not available· a:n:d in no case 
cited was the premium tendered back to the appli-
cant prior to his death. · · 
In Prince v. Western Empire Life lns?krance 
Company, 19 Utah.2d 174 (1967), 428 P2d-1()3this 
Court stated: · ·, 
"During the lifetime.of applicant no no-
tice of rejection was ever given to him, and no 
return.of the premium paid was ever offered. 
The applicant had no intimation that he was 
not insured or that ·he should act so as to J)r&o 
vent his ·$80,0.00.00 .worth of life insurance: 
from lapsing." 
As we haye pointed out previously ip. this brief 
the facts in the Prince case are completely OJ>p~site. 
to the f a:cts in this case on appeal. The Janguage i#: 
the conditional rec~ipt in thi_s case iS set forth b~fo~~:· 
- ' - . . ' - ' . :: ~ . 
· "This ·Payment Is Made tind Accepteq 
Subject To The Following Conditions: :: : , 
.. Insurance ·under the terms. of the· policy 
_applied for and suppl~mentarx p:,oyision (~.) 
if applied for, and subJ~ct _to the 'lnnits ~J2e(!I~ 
fied below shall take effect as of the last of any 
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medical examinations or tests required under 
the rules and practices of the Company or the 
date of this payment whichever shall be the 
later, provided on that date the Proposed In-
sured ( s), in the opinion of the Company's 
authorized officers at its Home Office was/ 
were insurable and acceptable under th~ rules 
and practices of the Company as a standard 
risk for the policy and/or supplementary pro-
vision in the amount, on the plan and other-
wise exactly as applied for; otherwise there 
shall be no liability on the part of the Company 
except to return this payment in the form of 
the Company's check." (R 180, 309) 
The conditional receipt in this case required con-
ditions not set forth in the binding receipt in the 
Prince case as fallows: 
"Insurance takes effect as of last of any 
medical examinations required." 
The applicant Delberet Fabrizio was notified an 
additional examination was required. (R 184) Del-
bert Fabrizio knew of the requirement months before 
his death. ( R 184, 77) 
The conditional receipt had another require-
ment not found in the Prince receipt that the applicant 
must be ·"insurable and acceptable ... as a standard 
risk." Obviously a man 5' 11" tall weighing 329 
pounds with high blood pressure is not a standard 
risk. 
The respondent in its Notice of Rejection of the 
application stated if the applicant were to be consid· 
ered at all it would have to be at a minimum of the 
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Table "H" rate. A standard risk .rate has no letter 
and the first rated policy level is ~'A/' It is plain to 
see Delbert Fabrizio's minimum rate was several 
steps away from a standard risk rate. In addition the 
insurance company advised Delbert . Fab~izio the 
"ERT" policy was not available ·at "the above rate 
(Table H) ." (R 184) 
That the conditions set forth in the conditional 
receipt must be met before the insurance company 
can be bound is a point well established by this Court 
in the case of Jones v. New York Li/ e Insurance Com-
pany, 253 P 200 (1927). 
In appellant's brief at page 15, appellant stated 
that the defendant accepted payment for a rated 
policy. This statement is unsupported by any evi-
dence in the record and is directly contradicted in ap-
pellant's own brief at page 5 where appellant admits 
the two premium checks (the alleged payment for 
the rated policy) were not mailed to respondent until 
after the death of Delbert Fabrizio which had occur-
red that morning and the two checks were not receiv-
ed by respondent until the day following the death 
of Delbert Fabrizio. 
In Couch on Insurance 2d Section 7 : 6 at page 
29 the following is found: 
'''An application for insurance is revoked 
by the death of the applicant before approval 
and acceptance of the application." 
There is no case cited by appellant which stands 
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for the proposition that as a result of an ambiguity 
in an application for insurance or the accompanying 
conditional receipt that an applicant is covered by 
insurance even though the insurance company rejects 
the application, gives notice thereof, closes the file, 
returns the premium and tenders it back to the appli-
cant prior to the applicant's death. 
In Mofrad v. New York Life Ins. Co., 206 F 2d 
491 (10th Cir. 1953) a case arising out of the Fed-
eral District Court of Utah the Court right after cit-
ing Janes v. New York Life Ins. Co. (Ibid) decided 
by this Court held that: 
"The provisions in the application agree-
ment do not fix the effective date of the insur-
ance contract. They simply impose conditions 
precedent to the taking effect of the insurance 
coverage . . . When read together they mean 
that the insurance coverage shall take effect ! 
only in the event the conditions precedent spe- ! 
cified in the application are fulfilled." 
The Court refused to find insurance coverage 
where the applicant failed to take the medical ex-
amination required, before his death. 
In Killpack v. Natianal Old Line Insurance Com-
pany, 229 F 2d 851 (10th Cir. 1956) a case heard by 
the Federal District Court of Utah the original ap-
plication for insurance had been rejected by the in-
surance company for the failure of the applicant to 
have a physical examination and report submitted 
timely to the insurance company. The applicant then 
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.made a new application after an in~rvening birth-
day but failed to sign the amendment to date the 
contract so as to show the applicant's insurance at 
50 (the age prior to the birthday). The applicant 
died before signing the amendment and the Court 
held the condition contained in the binding receipt 
had not been met and therefore there was no insur-
ance coverage. 
Once again this Court's attention is invited to 
the fact that the respondent insurance company re-
jected the application and tendered back. the pre-
mium of appellant prior to appellant's death. 
CONCLUSION 
1. Appellant seeks relief which is not available 
and appellant appeals from orders which were not 
made or entered by the lower Court and the appeal 
should be dismissed. 
2. The application for appellant was rejected 
by the respondent and the premium tendered back to 
the appellant prior to his death. All the argument of 
appellant concerning ambiguity is moot and inappli-
cable to this case. 
3. No counter-offer was made by respondent 
and the subsequent premiums tendered to the re-
spondent were neither sent by the soliciting agent 
nor received by respondent until after the death of 
the applicant. 
4. No application for insurance· was ever ac-
cepted by respondent and no policy was ever issued. 
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5. The trial Court appropriately entered a 
Judgment in favor of the defendant and against the 
plaintiff-appellant. 
Respondent respectfully requests this Court to 
either dismiss this appeal or to affirm the Judgment 
rendered by the trial Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACK L. SCHOENHALS 
721 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondent 
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